THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinsons' may be criticized. The circuit court of
appeals held that the state statute providing for the liquidation or reorganization of insolvent corporations was suspended because the federal government
had occupied the field under section 77B. It, despite the reasons advanced in
this note in support of state jurisdiction in the reorganization field, state receivership statutes are held suspended under the reasoning of the Robinson
case, states may nevertheless continue to exercise jurisdiction over reorganizations through the equity receivership. That this may be true is indicated by
the attempt of counsel in the Robinson case to have the receivership treated
as an equity proceeding, and by the reply of the court that the receiver was
appointed under the state statute. This distinction, between an equity receivership and a state statutory receivership, receives further support from the statement in In re SterbaS2 that the remedy of an equity receivership is not the
equivalent of a proceeding under the reorganization acts. Hence it may be
contended that federal legislation which suspends similar state statutes has no
effect on the equity receivership, apart from the power of a federal court to
supersede an equity proceeding.53 An analogy in support of this result is found
in the previous discussion of the assignment for the benefit of creditors: the
assignment has been sustained, even though statutory assignments have been
suspended, because it is a remedy which existed at common law.54 This approach, however, results in a return to the equity receivership, the evils of
which reorganization legislation was intended to obviate. Nevertheless, the
states should have the power to regulate the equity receivership for the purpose of eliminating its evils, as they have been held to have the power to provide
legislative safeguards for the administration of assignments for the benefit of
creditors.ss
NEGRO RESTRICTIONS AND THE "CHANGED
CONDITIONS" DOCTRINE
During the last two decades many property owners in our larger cities have
entered into covenants prohibiting the sale or rental of real estate to Negroes.
Subdividers have included the restrictive covenant in deeds of conveyance, and
"improvement associations" in already established residential neighborhoods
have encouraged property owners in a given area to sign and record group agreements limiting the use or sale of their respective parcels to members of the
5' 107 F. (2d) 5o (C.C.A. ioth 1939); see Effect of National Bankruptcy Act on State Insolvency Statutes, 49 Yale L. J. ro9o (194o). Contra: Gallagher v. Keystone Realty Holding
Co., 333 Pa. 9, 3 A. (2d) 426 (1939) (upholding the appointment of a receiver for a corporation

under a state statute whose discharge feature had been suspended (see note rg supra). The
court followed the intention of Congress argument (see notes 43-4, 47-9 supra, and related

text)).
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Caucasian race.' Since the adoption of these covenants, the "Negro situation"
in many instances has so materially changed that some of the covenantors, or
their successors, 2 have become handicapped by the restriction. When the threat
of a Negro invasion becomes imminent, property owners in the center or at the
far edge of the restricted tract enjoy the first concrete evidence of the restriction's utility, but possibly at the expense of the near-edge owners. If the latter
find themselves unable to rent or sell to white prospects because Negroes have
settled across the street, they may feel morally justified in refusing to remain a
"front line defense."
Damage actions for violation of Negro restrictions are rare, probably both
because of the difficulty in measuring damages for many and variously-situated
plaintiffs, and because such actions do not effect the desired result: keeping
the area restricted. Forfeitures under a right of re-entry for condition broken
zThe constitutionality of this private means of racial segregation is firmly established,
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Queensboro Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724,
67 So. 641 (i9i5); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (Igi8); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, z81 Cal. 68o, 186 Pac. 596 (i919); Parmelee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625,
x88 N.W. 330 (1922); Ridgway v. Cockburn, x63 Misc. 5I1, 296 N.Y. Supp. 936 (S. Ct. 1937).
Illinois, Colorado, Maryland, Kansas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Alabama take the same
view, and no state has yet held to the contrary, Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract,
21 Ill. L. Rev. 707 (1927).
Municipal residence ordinances, intended to segregate Negroes, were declared violative of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o
(1917). See also Harmony. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927), reversing Tyler v. Harmon, i6o La.
943, 107 So. 704 (1926); Liberty Annex Co. v. Dallas, 289 S.W. io67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
Covenants prohibiting the sale of the premises to Negroes have been declared void by some
states as contrary to public policy, or, in the case of a conveyance, as repugnant to the fee
simple estate granted; but the same courts have upheld restrictions upon the use or occupancy
of the premises by Negroes, thus effecting the desired result, Los Angeles Investment Co. v.
Gary, i8i Cal. 68o, i86 Pac. 59 (1919); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925);
White v. White, io8 W.Va. 128, i5o S.E. 531 (1929). Other states have enforced sale restrictions at least where there is a reasonable time limitation on the covenant Queensboro Land
Co. v. Cazeaux, x36 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915) (twenty-five years); Koehler v. Rowland, 275
Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (twenty-five years); Russell v. Wallace, 3o F. (2d) 98i (App.
D.C. 1929) (no time limit); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E. (2d) 37 (1939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 563 (1940) (no final
time limit, but a provision that after twenty years the contract could be abrogated by written
agreement of the owners of 75 per cent of the frontage); see Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438,
292 Pac. 783 (i93o); Eason v. Buffaoe, i98 N.C. 520, 152 S.E. 496 (i93o); Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N.Y. Supp. 936 (S. Ct. 1937).
2 Courts of equity uniformly hold that subsequent grantees must comply with the terms of
the covenant, whether it was created in a deed of conveyance or by a recorded neighborhood
agreement. "The question is not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a
party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered
into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased," 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 472
(3 d ed. 194o).
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have been more frequently declared,3 but the vast majority of actions to enforce
these restrictions involve injunction proceedings.4 A defense frequently invoked
in such a suit is that of "changed conditions." It is a well-established principle
that where conditions have so materially changed since the inauguration of a
restrictive covenant that its purpose has failed and its enforcement would work
undue hardship upon the defendant with no substantial benefit to the plaintiffs,
equity will refuse to issue an injunction.s
The Kansas Supreme Court in Clark v. Vaughan,6 recognizing the hardship
imposed upon "front line" property owners where a Negro district had expanded
to their street, denied an injunction on the ground that it would be inequitable
to force the defendants to suffer virtual confiscation of their property to protect
inner property, which was not in turn protecting them. But the dissent in the
Clark case, voicing the attitude of most courts,7 pointed out that this is the
exact situation the parties must have contemplated when they entered into the
agreement. They contracted to keep Negroes out of the area, obviously knowing that they were powerless to prevent them from occupying adjacent territory.
In other words, there had been no unforeseen change which had defeated the
purpose of the restriction. In Porterv. Johnson,8 the Missouri Appellate Court,
in denying the applicability of the changed conditions doctrine in similar circunstances, unnecessarily added the questionable argument that the restriction
created an easement in favor of the owners of the other parcels, and that this
easement was a property right which could not be taken away without eminent
domain proceedings.
How much weight should a court of equity give the changed conditions defense in Negro restriction cases?
3 Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (i918); Los Angeles Investment Co. v.
Gary, 18i Cal. 68o, x86 Pac. 596 (191g). Probably a court will be more hesitant about enforcing a forfeiture provision if the right of entry is vested in a remote grantor or his heirs, and the
district is definitely "going colored." See Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496
(1932).

4 The

mere fact that the covenant contains a penalty provision does not preclude enforce702 (App. D.C. 1925) ($2000 penalty provision).
In Queensboro Land Co. v. Cazeaux, i36 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (i915), the covenant provided
for injunction and damages as the remedies, but the grantor asked for rescission from his
grantee who had reconveyed to a Negro. It was held that rescission would be a proper remedy,
but that the defendant would first be given an opportunity to get a reconveyance from the
Negro in order to preserve his original bargain purchase from the plaintiff.
sTrustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 31x (1882) (building restriction);
Ewertson v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344, 57 N.E. 1o51 (1goo) (building line); Windemere-Grand
Improvement and Protective Ass'n v. American State Bank of Highland Park, 205 Mich. 539,
172 N.W. 29 (X919) (building restriction); see Rombauer v. Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 21,
40 S.W. (2d) 545, 554 (X93i).
6 31 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930).

ment in equity, Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 F. (2d)

7 Grady v. Garland, 89 F. (2d) 817 (App. D.C. 1937); Mead v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295,
196 AUt. 330 (1937); Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. xi5o, IIS S.W. (2d) 529 (1938).
8232 Mo. App. ii~o
, i15 S.W. (2d) 529 (1938).
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The changed conditions doctrine originated in cases involving restrictions
upon the type, quality, position, and use of buildings. It has often been obscured
by the additional defenses of waiver and acquiescence where the plaintiffs have
failed to protest other violations, and by that of abandonment where numerous
surrounding owners have violated the restriction.9 Furthermore, in the building cases the fact situations have been so varied, and have so often given rise to
special equities, that it is extremely difficult to determine what types of changes
will, in themselves, constitute a successful defense.
In discussing the advisability of applying the defense of change in circumstances to the Negro restriction cases it will be helpful to distinguish the following three situations: (i) where the change has occurred outside the restricted
area, but not within; (2) where the change has occurred within the restricted
area, but only in a well-defined part of it; and (3)where a general change has
occurred within the restricted area.
Although some courts in building cases have held that changes outside of the
restricted tract will not justify refusal of equitable enforcement,o others adhere
to the opposite view.- Perhaps the latter are justified in allowing surrounding
changes to defeat enforcement in certain building situations, but this "lenient"
attitude should not prevail in Negro cases. In the first place, the difference in
the size of the area affected may warrant different treatment. Inasmuch as
building restrictions are often imposed upon only a small group of lots, a surrounding change which affects one lot will directly affect the other parcels and
tend completely to defeat the purpose of the restriction. But where, as in the
typical covenant against Negroes, a large area is involved, an outside change
affects only that part of the area adjacent to the boundary. Secondly, in a building case, the change may be one entirely unforeseen. For example, if a large
stockyard were unexpectedly built on the edge of a subdivision restricted to
homes of expensive construction, the covenant certainly should be deemed unenforceable, for no one could be expected to build a costly residence "back of
the yards." The possibility of an infiltration of Negroes into adjacent areas, on
the other hand, is not only foreseen, but probably the moving cause of the contract.12 Finally, a property owner on the edge of a tract restricted to residences

might forceably argue that surrounding changes have so altered the situation
9See Ewertson v. Gerstenberg, 186 Il. 344, 57 N.E. io5I (igoo); Starkey v. Gardner, 194
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that a store upon his property would benefit not only him, but also the owners
throughout the tract. It may be more convenient for the residents in the protected tract if a shopping district, just outside the area, were allowed to expand
across the street instead of being forced to spread out on only one side. A similar argument in a Negro case certainly could not be advanced.
If, however, outside changes cause the court to make an exception of borderline property, the result might be to create a boundary which, by successive
exceptions, would recede until the entire restriction had been destroyed.3 Permitting boundary exceptions results in the second situation, a change within
a well-defined part of the restricted area. In building cases it has been held that
such a change will not, in itself, justify a violation of the covenant in a distinctly
separate part of the tract; 4 application of this rule usually enables the courts
to prevent total destruction of the restriction, but only if there is no danger of a
constantly receding border. Where a streetcar line, for example, is held to
justify the building of business property on one street there is little possibility
that owners on the next street back will construct more stores. And even if
business demands did warrant their construction, the justification of a streetcar line would be absent. On the other hand, in the Negro cases, since the owners in each new "front line" would have the same justification their predecessors
had, a constantly receding border is the almost inevitable result of making
boundary exceptions.
Thus the changed conditions doctrine should be applied to Negro covenants,
if at all, only in the third situation-where there has been a general change
within the restricted area. Such a change, being in most instances unforeseen,
justifies a court of equity in refusing enforcement. But even here, the hardships imposed by the restriction in a district which has become dotted with
Negro residents, could be alleviated without the changed conditions doctrine.
If numerous uncontested violations constituted the change, the defenses of
waiver and abandonment should suffice. If there had been no violations, but
Negroes had legally been able to occupy many homes because a sizable minority
of the owners had refused to enter into the agreement, enforcement could be
denied by holding that the parties intended the covenant to become effective
only if signed by substantially all the owners within the designated territory. s
In Fosterv. Stewart 6 the California Appellate Court adopted this attitude, point1344 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1931).
'4 Cassidy v. Kruvant, 97 N.J. Eq. 372, 127 Ad. 339 (1925); Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257
Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 884 (1926).
is The doubt as to exactly how much of the tract must be included to render the covenant
effective is eliminated if the instrument itself provides that it must contain a given number of
valid signatures, Oberwise v. Paulos, 124 Cal. App. 247, 12 P. (2d) i56 (1932), or the signatures
of the owners of a certain percentage of the frontage in the described area, Burke v. Kleiman,
277 Ill. App. S19 ('934) (9s per cent required).
16 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P. (2d) 497 (1933); see Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W. (2d) x75 (Mo.
App. 1939).
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ing out that "no equitable principles exist upon which to base a decree prohibiting a lot owner from renting or conveying his lot to one other than of the
Caucasian race while the owners of lots on both sides are left free to lease, rent,
or to convey to whomsoever they please." Since enforcement should certainly
be denied in these cases of general change within the district, the practicability
of maintaining the tenuous distinction between changed conditions and other
equitable defenses might be questioned. But if the distinction is preserved, and
the courts were to realize that the changed conditions doctrine need not be invoked even in this group of cases, perhaps there would be less chance of their
misapplying the doctrine to situations, like that in the Clark case, 7 where the
change is outside the restricted area and the other equitable defenses are unavailable. x8
Negro restrictive covenants may or may not be socially desirable; the foregoing considerations merely indicate that as long as society permits them, courts
should strictly enforce them. Courts should be reluctant to refuse enforcement
of an agreement upon which the plaintiffs have relied, merely because it has
proved disadvantageous to the defendants. Furthermore, covenantors should
not be encouraged to rely upon the "leniency" of courts of equity to protect
them in the event of extreme changes, for this protection is partly illusory.
Even where there is such a complete change of conditions that an injunction is
unquestionably denied, most courts have refused to declare the right to other
remedies extinguished.'9 As a result, after the restriction has become ineffectual,
the property owner may find that the remote possibility of an action for damages affects the marketability of his title The Supreme Court of Missouri, in
Pickel v. McCawley,21 an action to quiet title, decreed that since the settling of
Negroes throughout the district had rendered the covenant void, the title was
clear of the restriction. But until other states follow the lead of Missouri,' the
breaking down of a restrictive covenant by application of the changed condi.2

17Note 6 supra.
18 It would possibly be desirable to utilize the changed conditions doctrine in the almost inconceivable situation where the parties have expressly stipulated that the agreement is to become effective even though not signed by a sizable majority.
19Grady v. Garland, 89 F. (2d) 817 (App. D.C. 1937); Clark, Covenants and Interests Run-

ning with the Land 164 (1929);

44

Harv. L. Rev. 989 (193i).

20 See United Co-op Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, io8 S.W. (2d) 507
2x329 Mo. i66, 44 S.W. (2d) 857 (193).

(1937).

22The Supreme Court of Florida recently decreed a title clear of a building restriction because changed conditions had defeated its purpose, Barton v. Moline Properties, 121 Fla. 683,
z64 So. 551 (i935). Since building restrictions, unlike Negro covenants, are generally of indefinite duration, there is even greater necessity for their being completely extinguished by
equitable decree.

7, 6

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

tions doctrine will leave a useless restriction, clouding titles and impairing sales
and mortgage transactions.23
It is suggested that property owners enter into a Negro covenant in the future
only after a careful analysis of its possible effects in the light of their individual
circumstances. Then, if they decide that the restriction is desirable, they should
expect strict enforcement from the courts, and protect themselves against extreme changes by drafting a covenant which includes a workable plan of voluntary abrogation,24 and, possibly, a scheme for contribution by all of the
parties toward mitigating the special losses falling upon owners of boundary
property.
3 See Edwards v. West Woodridge Theatre Co., 55 F. (2d) 524 (App. D.C. 193). See also
Administrative Rules of the Federal Housing Administrator for Mutual Mortgage Insurance
under section 203 of the National Housing Act, § 5 (1) (July 1, 1939).
24 If too large a majority is necessary for abrogation, the practical difficulty of securing numerous signatures may defeat the utility of the provision. See instrument set out in Burke v.
Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, providing that the agreement is to terminate on or after a set date
if the owners of 75 per cent of the restricted frontage sign an agreement to abrogate; otherwise
an automatic renewal is to occur.

